25 July 1967

HEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTUR

SUBJECT: CIECUMC/CUMUNIX Hessage of 24 July on "Situation in Kores as of Mid-July 1967"

- L. We have been concerned for some time about North Korean military and subversive activity in South Korea and agree with General Bonesteel's recommendation that a Mational Intelligence Matinate be prepared on this subject. With your approval, we shall set on MIE on this subject in train, aiming at a UNIB target date early in September.
- 2. We after the following comments on the substance of General Bonesteel's message: We are just as impressed as General Bonesteel with the dimensions of the recent Morth Korean activity. But we do not entirely agree on the question of Morth Korean intentions. CINCUNC's interpretation in this regard is oversimplified in our view. The Morth Koreans certainly appear to wish to test ROK military defenses along the DMZ and to test the ROK see for the Communist "fish." They probably see their actions too as: (a) a contribution to Hanoi's war; (b) a distraction and excuse for poor economic performance within their own borders; and (c) a contribution to ROK political instability.
- 3. Promyang's new course of action, in our judgment, is an admission that "peaceful" means of taking over the South no longer offer reasonable hope of success. Herein lies the danger, of course. From now on, one must expect the worst from the North. They will do what they think they can get away with. It is indeed a time of testing, as CINCUNC indicates.
- 4. We agree that the North Korean activity will increase ROK reluctance to ship more troops to Vietnam. But so long as US forces in Korea remain at strength and so long as the proper financial inducements are offered, we believe that the ROKS would send more troops. Action, however, would probably be delayed until at least September or October when the opposition party returns to its Mitional Assembly seats, as we think it will.

CHERMAN KENT

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